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philosophical questions. It looks at various traditional views of modeling and defends the
idea that modeling is a form of surrogate reasoning involving two distinct steps: indirect
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1. Introduction
I live on a racially diverse block in South Philadelphia. A little more than half of my block
is Caucasian, a little less than half is African American, and the rest of the people are of
Asian or Latino descent. Let’s imagine three things about my block and the city it is in:
First, imagine that everyone else on the block values living in a diverse neighborhood.
Second, let’s imagine that there is some comfort threshold that everyone on the block
has. If, say, less than 30% of the block was African American, the African Americans
currently living here might feel uncomfortable and decide to move. Finally, let’s imagine
that the whole city has this preference structure.
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What will happen to the city in the long run? Will the city gradually move towards more
and more integrated blocks like mine (because people value diversity)? Will blocks be
relatively integrated, but with some being 30% African American and some 30%
Caucasian (because those are the “floor” thresholds)? Will the city become even more
integrated? Or will it become more segregated (because people aren’t comfortable being
in a very small minority)?
I have a very hard time imagining what would happen in this scenario. When I have asked
friends about it, many of them see the 30% threshold as especially salient and think we
will find pockets of 30% Caucasians and 30% African Americans. But almost no one who
comes up with the right answer, which economist Thomas Schelling discovered (1978) by
constructing a model.
Schelling’s original model was concrete, consisting of a chessboard, dimes, and nickels.
The squares of the chessboard represented addresses in a city, dimes and nickels
represented households consisting of people from two racial groups, which I will call A
and B. The dimes and nickels were distributed randomly throughout the board.
Besides the individuals and
their initially random
spatial layout, the model
also contained a utility
Click to view larger
function and a movement
Figure 15.1 Computer simulation of Schelling’s
segregation model. On the left is shown a random
rule. The utility function
distribution of the agent times. As time moves
said that each individual
forward, large clusters of the two agent types form.
prefers that at least 30%
of its neighbors be of the
same type. So the As want at least 30% of their neighbors to be As and likewise for the
Bs. Schelling’s neighborhoods were defined (p. 263) as standard Moore neighborhoods, a
set of nine adjacent grid elements. An agent standing on some grid element e can have
anywhere from zero to eight neighbors in the adjoining elements.
The model is made dynamic by a simple movement rule. In each cycle of the model, its
agents choose to either remain in place or move to a new location. When it is an agent’s
turn to make a decision, it determines whether its utility function is satisfied. If if is
satisfied, the agent remains where it is. If it is not satisfied, then the agent moves to the
nearest empty location. This sequence of decisions continues until all of the agents’ utility
functions are satisfied.
When the movement rule and utility function are implemented in Schelling’s physical
model, something very surprising happens: a cascade is observed which leads from
integrated neighborhoods to highly segregated neighborhoods. In a modern computer
implementation of this model on a 51 x 51 grid (shown in Figure 15.1), a preference for
30% like neighbors usually leads to agents having 70% like neighbors.
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Schelling urged his readers to actually take out a chessboard and implement his model so
they could see the model’s dynamics unfold. What one sees in doing this, or
reimplementing the model in a computer, is a cascade: agents that start out satisfied
become unsatisfied when a neighbor leaves or a new one moves in. This leads to
movement, which leads to more agents becoming unsatisfied. A small patch of
dissatisfaction can result in widespread movement, and ultimately, segregation. While
there are a few agent configurations that are integrated where every agent is satisfied,
these states are very rare and nearly impossible to generate from random agent
movement. Thus, Schelling’s major result is that small preferences for similarity can lead
to massive segregation. This result is quite robust across many changes to the model
including different utility functions, different rules for updating, differing neighborhood
sizes, and different spatial configurations (Muldoon, Smith, and Weisberg, 2012).
Schelling’s model does what my imagination couldn’t do. It predicts that my integrated
block in South Philadelphia is unstable in the long run. Although the model is idealized in
many ways, it says that over time, my block is likely to become homogenous if the
movement rules and utility function of the model are anything like the ones that real
people have.
Although Schelling’s model is a simple one, I think it very nicely illustrates how an idea
can be sharpened using a model. This sharpening forces us to examine our explicit and
implicit assumptions, and extends the reach of our imaginative capacities, allowing
(p. 264) us to explain and predict complex phenomena that are difficult or impossible to
gain a complete cognitive grasp of. This chapter explores the methodology of modeling,
showing how it has been applied to philosophical questions and can continue to do so in
the future.

2. What is Modeling?
Modeling is a form of surrogate reasoning, a practice in which one constructs and
analyzes a model in order to learn, indirectly, about something else. Most commonly in
both scientific and philosophical contexts, models are simpler than the real world target
systems they represent and they are idealized relative to these targets.
Surrogate reasoning involves two steps: indirect representation of a target with a model
and analysis of that model. One first constructs or acquires a model, and specifies the
intended target of that model. This step does not involve extensive empirical or
conceptual interrogation of a target and construction on the basis of inference from the
properties of that target. Schelling didn’t derive his model from a detailed description of
Philadelphia or some other city. Instead, he asked himself about some of the essential
properties of a city, and used those to create his model. So a model shouldn’t be thought
of as simply as a representation of a target, but rather an intermediary between the
target and an analysis. This is why I call model-based reasoning “surrogate reasoning.”
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After constructing or acquiring the model, one subjects it to analysis. Techniques of
analysis vary widely, and depend on both the type of the model and the question of
interest. But typically one is interested in understanding the properties of various
features of the model, and especially how some mechanistic features give rise to other
behavioral features. Sometimes we try to give complete analyses, uncovering everything
there is to know about the model. More often, analyzes are goal-directed, trying to
answer specific questions. For example, Schelling’s model can be used to answer
questions about the tipping points or thresholds of segregation.
Modeling can be contrasted with direct representation and analysis. In this style of
theorizing, one begins by representing a target system using what one knows about the
target to generate an accurate representation. Although approximations and idealizations
may enter the representation for pragmatic or epistemic reasons, the goal is to depict the
features of some target system. If we wanted to study segregation by direct
representation, we would look carefully at a time series of demographic information, such
as data about each census tract. From this data, one could construct a representation of
city migration patterns. One might also try to infer likely future patterns, or even the
psychological motivations underlying them. It is possible that this would generate
something like the Schelling model, but the procedure by which it was constructed would
be very different. In direct representation, we analyze the system itself. In modeling, we
study a constructed intermediary. The difference is one of practice and procedure, not
necessarily the end product (Weisberg, 2007).
One of the virtues of modeling is that models are extremely flexible tools. They can be
used to study a single target, a cluster of targets, a generalized target, or even targets
known (p. 265) not to exist. In philosophical contexts, models are rarely used to study a
single target. Instead, they are most often used to answer how possibly questions (Dray,
1968; Resnik, 1991; Forber, 2010) or what would happen if questions, and hence usually
have generalized systems as their targets. And sometimes, the targets of philosophical
models are themselves hypothetical systems which do not exist, such as a perfectly just
society, or a universe with only two particles.

3. Models
What kinds of things are models? This basic and central question has remained
surprisingly controversial in the philosophical literature. Some philosophers, especially
those who defend the semantic view of theories (e.g., Suppes, 1960; Suppe, 1989) argue
that scientific models are the same kinds of things as logician’s models. The motivating
idea for this view is that theories should be language independent. Although we may
describe theories with words, equations, and diagrams, they should not be tied to any of
these descriptions. Proponents of the semantic view argue that the theory itself is a
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structure which satisfies such a description. A true theory, then, is a structure which is
isomorphic to structures in nature. Models are thus a kind of mathematical structure.
More recent proponents of the semantic view, especially Bas van Fraassen (1980) and
Elizabeth Lloyd (1994), argue that models are sets of trajectories in a state space. A state
space is a set of points corresponding to the properties of a system. They are organized in
such a way that each dimension of this space is an independent way that the state can
vary. Trajectories through the space are time ordered sets of states that describe the
temporal evolution of a model system. When there is some kind of match between the
trajectories in the state space and trajectories corresponding to the target system, we
have a model of the target system.
Another traditional view about models sees them as complements to mathematical
theories, and hence not mathematical themselves. In this view, models are material
analogies (Campbell, 1957; Hesse, 1966; for a dissenting view, see Duhem, 1906) they
allow a scientist to develop an intuitive picture of a complex mathematical principle by
comparison to something well-understood and concrete.
Hesse and others have emphasized that many important theoretical advances have been
made when theorists understood that some property of one system was materially
analogous to that of another. For example, the mathematics describing the propagation of
light might be accompanied by an analogy comparing the propagation of light waves to
the propagation of water waves. While we no longer think it is necessary for light to
propagate though a physical medium, the analogy between light and water waves allowed
James Clerk Maxwell to develop the equations describing light propagation.
Although most of the philosophers writing about the nature of theories today do not
emphasize material analogies, this view has remained influential in the modeling
literature in two ways. First, almost all philosophers of science accept that concrete
models can do important scientific work. Watson and Crick used a material model of their
proposed DNA structure to make inferences about base-pair hydrogen bonding (Watson,
2011). Walter (p. 266) Newlyn and Bill Phillips constructed a hydraulic model to study
how tax rates affect the British economy (Morgan, 2012). And the United States Army
Corps of Engineers constructed a working tidal model of the San Francisco Bay and Delta
Region in order to study what would happen if the Bay was dammed up (Weisberg, 2013).
A more controversial appeal to concrete systems can be found in a literature which
asserts that all scientific models are fictional scenarios. Philosophers defending this view
see all models, including mathematical models, as fictional scenarios that would be
concrete if they were real. So on this view, Schelling’s model isn’t an abstract
configuration of states and set of transition rules, but is actually an imaginary world: a
neighborhood with people, preferences, and movement rules (Godfrey-Smith, 2006; see
Weisberg, 2013 for a critique).

Page 5 of 29

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
My own view of models is that they are composed of two parts: structure and
interpretation. Like the critics of the semantic view, I think models cannot simply be
mathematical objects. Bare structures stand in relations to target systems, but they often
have too many of the wrong kinds of relations, and not enough of the right kind. However,
mathematical, computational, or concrete structures, suitably interpreted, can stand in
the right kinds of relations to represent features of targets. I call the relevant
interpretations modelers’ construals.
Construals provide an interpretation for the model’s structure, set up relations of
denotation between the model and real-world targets, and give criteria for evaluating the
goodness-of-fit between a model and a target. They are composed of four parts: the
assignment, the modeler’s intended scope, dynamical fidelity criteria, and
representational fidelity criteria. The assignment and scope determine the relationship
between parts of the model and parts of the target system. The fidelity criteria are the
standards theorists use to evaluate a model’s ability to represent real phenomena.
Assignments are explicit specifications of how parts of real or imagined target systems
are to be mapped onto parts of the model. This explicit coordination is especially
important because although the parts of some models seem naturally to coordinate with
parts of real-world phenomena, such as grid locations and addresses in Schelling’s model,
this is often not the case. For example, in a simple model of population growth, a
population’s growth is described by an exponential function. Nothing about this function
suggests population size—it could just as easily signify a nuclear chain reaction. The
theorist’s assignment is what gives this function its meaning.
Assignments are often not made explicit in discussions of models, because communities
of modelers have standard reading conventions for model descriptions. Where
conventions are not explicit, are being violated, or where the modeler needs to be
especially explicit, he or she will be forced to make the assignment explicit in discussions
about the model.
Models inevitably have structure not present in the real-world phenomena they are being
used to study. For example, Schelling’s model has a perfectly regular grid and perfectly
squared off edges. No actual city has these features. So are these features of the model
intended to represent something about the target, or are they merely artifacts of the
idealizations that went into constructing the model? A model’s intended scope specifies
the answer to this question, telling the theorist what parts of the model should be taken
seriously.
The other aspects of a modeler’s construal are fidelity criteria. While the assignment and
scope describe how the target system is intended to be represented with the model,
fidelity (p. 267) criteria describe how similar the model must be to the world in order to
be considered an adequate representation. I divide these criteria into two types:
Dynamical fidelity criteria tell us how close the output of the model—the predictions it
makes about the values of dependent variables given some independent variables—must
be to the output of the real-world phenomenon. Representational fidelity criteria are
Page 6 of 29

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
more complex and give us standards for evaluating whether the structure of the model
maps well onto the target system of interest. Typically, these criteria specify how closely
the model’s internal structure must match the causal structure of the real-world
phenomenon to be considered an adequate representation.
For example, say that Schelling’s model of segregation was targeted at the city of
Philadelphia. One way to evaluate the model is with very high-fidelity criteria. If we did
this, then the model’s predicted equilibrium state, as well as the dynamics leading to that
state, the utility functions of the agents, the movement rules, and so forth would be
compared with the city’s distribution of racial groups, looking for a very close match.
Another way to evaluate the model is with a qualitative, not quantitative criterion. Yet
another kind of fidelity criterion says that the model should be regarded as a howpossibly model, qualitatively matching the segregation patterns of the city, but with no
expectation that the movement rules and utility functions were realistic.
Fully describing fidelity criteria requires an account of the model/target relation. If one
thinks of models as (ideally) true descriptions of targets, fidelity criteria simply become
an error tolerance, specifying how far one can deviate from truth. But when one has an
account of the model/target relation that takes into account the highly idealized nature of
many contemporary models, the situation is more complex.
Along with a concrete, mathematical, or computational structures, theorists’ construals
generate models. To say that a model is structure plus interpretation means that models
are structures whose parts are interpreted via their assignments. They can potentially
denote parts of a target as specified by the theorists’ intended scope. And they are
evaluated by the theorists’ fidelity criteria. These four components of the construal
constitute the theorists’ interpretation of the model.
Whatever view about the nature of models is adopted, it is important to distinguish
between models and their descriptions. Model descriptions specify models, and stand in
many-many relationships to them. A single model might be described by words,
equations, or diagrams. And any imprecision in a model description, including parameters
left as dummy variables, will specify multiple models. Scientists often refer to equations
as “models,” but I think it is important to see equations as descriptions. Models’
structures should be seen as independent of the way they are described.

4. Target Systems
Models are not compared directly to real phenomena, but to target systems, which are
abstractions over these phenomena. The reason for this is that phenomena have many
more properties than are represented in even the most realistic models. So when a
modeler is ready to start comparing her model to the world, she constructs a target. She
does so by (p. 268) identifying a spatio-temporal region of interest and the contents of
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PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
that region of interest. In scientific cases, the choice of target is driven by the research
question of the scientist, specifically, which part of the empirical world is under
investigation. Philosophical cases allow somewhat more latitude. Sometimes philosophers
are interested in actual extant practices. Other times, they are interested in ideal
scenarios such as conditions of perfect justice, or universes with minimal structure. Still
other times, the goal of philosophical modeling can be the investigation of concepts, and
there are no real or imagined targets for models.
Whatever the case, when a model is targeted at a real or imagined system, it represents
only some parts of that system. Theorists must abstract away from the full richness of
phenomena and aim their models at a set of features of a real-world phenomenon. For
example, say I was interested in modeling a communication system. We might start by
identifying the real-world phenomenon of people speaking English to one another. But
this phenomenon is far too complex to capture in a model, so the modeler must decide
which features to focus on. If the model was being constructed in philosophy of language,
perhaps in order to investigate questions about intentionality, we might work with a very
abstract target consisting of a set of symbols, states of the word, and transmission
channels. However, a linguist would want to include many more details about the nature
of language in her target, a communications engineer would include more about the
transmission system, and so forth.
This example shows that the relationship between real-world phenomena and targets is
one-to-many, which opens the door for a massive proliferation of target systems. Since
there are so many different targets that can be generated from the same phenomenon,
does anything go? Are there standards that govern the kinds of abstractions that theorists
make?
Alkistis Elliott-Graves (ms) has argued that the answer to this question is no. Although
many targets can be generated from one phenomenon, there are general norms for
constructing appropriate targets. She argues that target system generation should be
thought of as consisting of two conceptually distinct stages. Modelers partition the
phenomenon into sets of features and then they abstract from these features in order to
generate the target. Partitioning, she argues, is guided by the pragmatic norm of
usefulness. The modeler should ask whether the relevant features for the topic of
investigation get captured by the partition. Abstraction is more highly constrained by the
norm of aptness, limited to what one can omit without distortion. Whether or not one
accepts Elliott-Graves’ account, it seems right to say that the enormous latitude of targets
is not limitless. The flexibility it affords is positive, but the pragmatics of modeling impose
limits.
Philosophical contexts, and, to be sure, some scientific ones, do not always require
targets that are abstractions over real-world phenomena. More specifically, constructing
and analyzing models of targets known not to exist (e.g. perpetual motion machines, time
traveling bricks, or single particles alone in the universe) have played important roles in
scientific and philosophical modeling. Sometimes, models are studied simply for their
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own sakes, without any target at all in mind. A good example of the latter category is
Conway’s Game of Life cellular automaton (Gardner, 1970). This model consists of an
array of cells, which can each be in an alive state or a dead state. Transition rules
determine how the states change, and these rules typically depend on the states of
neighboring states.
One of the reasons we study models without targets is in order to help to
sensitize our imagination so that we learn how to notice things we might have missed
otherwise when looking at real targets. For example, Dennett discusses the interesting
fact that when we begin thinking about the Game of Life, we start by describing a grid,
cells, and the rules for each cell. But fairly soon we are talking about the patterns and
apparent motion in the game.
(p. 269)

Note that there has been a distinct ontological shift as we move between levels;
whereas at the physical level there is no motion, and the only individuals, cells,
are defined by their fixed spatial location, at this design level we have the motion
of persisting objects; it is one and the same glider that has moved southeast …
Here is a warming-up exercise for what is to follow: should we say that there is
real motion in the Life world, or only apparent motion? The flashing pixels on the
computer screen are a paradigm case, after all, of what a psychologist would call
apparent motion. Are there really gliders that move, or are there just patterns of
cell state that move? And if we opt for the latter, should we say at least that these
moving patterns are real?
(Dennett, 1991)
Nevertheless, many of our most important cases of modeling are target-directed. A
suitable target is chosen and the model is coordinated to that target by the modelers’
construal. When that happens, what kinds of relations must a model stand in to its target?

5. Model/Target Relations
There are two types of accounts of model/target relations in the literature: modeltheoretic accounts and similarity accounts. Model-theoretic accounts are the dominant
view. Like other aspects of the modeling literature, they find their original home in
discussions of the semantic view of theories. Such accounts typically posit that models
must be isomorphic to their targets, although some proponents of the semantic view have
weakened the requirement to homomorphism (Lloyd, 1994), or partial isomorphism (da
Costa and French, 2003).
Isomorphism is a mapping between two sets that preserves structure and relations.
Formally, an isomorphism is a bijective map between two sets such that the mapping
function f and its inverse are both homomorphisms, structure-preserving maps between
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these two structures. This account of the model/target relation remains influential, but
many philosophers have argued that it cannot appropriately deal with the relationship
between idealized models and their targets (e.g. Hendry and Psillos, 2007).
As an alternative, Steven French and colleagues have offered the partial isomorphism
account. Proponents of this account say that the model/target relation is tripartite,
corresponding to the part of the model that is isomorphic to the target, the part that is
not isomorphic to the target, and the part that is “left open” with respect to the target. A
model is partially isomorphic to its target when a substructure of the model is isomorphic
to a substructure of the target. Such an account can deal with some kinds of idealized
models. For example, consider the idealization of elastic collisions that is associated with
the ideal gas model. This idealization says that when two particles of the gas collide, the
pair (p. 270) maintains their combined kinetic energy after the collision. This is not true
for molecular gases (hydrogen gas, oxygen gas, water vapor, etc.) because when they
collide, some kinetic energy is transferred to the molecules’ internal degrees of freedom
(internal rotations and oscillations). However, the truth of this idealization is not required
for many ideal gas model-based explanations and, in these cases, the idealized model can
be confined to the non-isomorphic substructure without any loss.
But this will only handle idealization up to a point. In many cases, it is the idealized
features of models themselves that are supposed to be representations of targets’
features. For example, the Schelling model’s idealized features, such as agents’ utility
functions and spatial distribution, are the very things that represent properties of real
people and do the model’s explanatory work. This has led some philosophers, including
me, to look elsewhere for an account of model/target relations.
Similarity accounts posit that the model/target relation is one of similarity: a good model
is similar to its target in certain respects and degrees (Hesse, 1966; Giere, 1988, GodfreySmith, 2006). Proponents of this type of account tend to defend their account along two
lines. First, they argue that model-theoretic accounts do not have the resources to
account for the relationship between the most common type of model and its target:
idealized models relating to realistic targets. Second, they argue that modelers often talk
and think about models as if they resemble their targets. This is taken as evidence for the
nature of the relation.
There is a long tradition of skepticism about similarity. In “Natural Kinds,” W. V. O. Quine
argued that similarity was “logically repugnant” (Quine, 1969) because it couldn’t be
analyzed in terms of more basic notions. He also thought that mature sciences would
dispense with similarity all together. In a more detailed discussion, Nelson Goodman
(1972) agrees with Quine and adds another challenge. He argues that similarity is too
promiscuous a relation to do any philosophical work. For any three objects, there will
always be some respect in which two of the objects resemble each other more than the
third. This, Goodman argues, shows that there can be no context-free similarity metric.
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For many philosophers, this was the end of the matter. Positing similarity as the model/
target relation was a dead end. Others took the criticism to be a constraint on a
reasonable account of similarity; it must be a context-relative relation. For example, on
Giere’s (1988) account, a model must resemble its target in certain “respects and
degrees.” Cartwright (1983) argues that the relevant similarity between models and their
targets is “behavioral similarity,” meaning the similarity of the model’s and the target’s
causal structures.
While this criticism of Goodman’s was simply taken on board, Quine and Goodman also
challenged proponents of similarity to give a reductive analysis, showing how some
particular model and some particular target could be more similar to each other than
other random models and targets. Much less has been written on this question, but some
of my own work attempts to give such an analysis.
In Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World, I argue that we can
analyze model/target similarity in terms of weighted feature matching, and idea that has
its origin in Amos Tversky’s contrast account of similarity (Tversky, 1977; Tversky and
Gati, 1978). The basic idea is that a model’s similarity to its a target is a function of the
features it shares and the features it doesn’t share. Because Goodman is correct and
there is (p. 271) no general, context-free account of similarity, some of a model’s and a
target’s features are weighted more heavily than others.
The account can be developed as follows: First, we begin a set of features Δ. This feature
set can contain quantitative or qualitative predicated, including “is purple,” “is to the left
of ξ,” “will rain with probability 0.9,” and so forth. Further, for model M and target T, m is
the set of features in Δ possessed by M and t is the set of features in Δ possessed by T.
Modelers’ fidelity criteria also implicitly provide a weighting function f(∙), which is
defined over the power set of Δ. The overall similarity of the model to the target is given
by an equation of this form1:

When modeling, it is customary to distinguish between the overall properties and
patterns of a system (often called the “output” in computational and mathematical
modeling) from the underlying mechanisms generating these properties. I will call the
first set of properties attributes, and the second set mechanisms. It is important for many
kinds of modeling, including philosophical modeling, that they be distinguished. The
reason for this is that in some instances of modeling, we care far more about feature
matching between one or the other type of feature.
As an example, we can return once again to Schelling’s model. When the model comes to
equilibrium, it contains racially segregated clusters driven by agents’ utility functions and
rules for movement. Attributes such as degrees of clustering are states of the model and
mechanisms such as agents’ movement rules are the transition rules of the model. Insofar
as Schelling’s model explains segregation in actual cities, then there has to be some
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Modeling
relation between the model’s attributes and the city’s attributes. And there has to be
some relation between the model’s transition rules and the actual mechanisms that drive
segregation in the city.
Now consider two other uses of Schelling’s model. If it is used to ask a “what would
happen if?” type of question, such as I opened this chapter with, all that is required is
that the mechanisms of the model match the mechanisms in the scenario I wished to
investigate. It might also be used to answer a how possibly question. Most American
cities are highly segregated, even if their overall racial breakdown is mixed. What could
possibly cause a racially mixed city to be segregated? Schelling’s model offers one
answer to this question. In evaluating a how possibly question, all that is required is that
the attributes of the target (racially segregated neighborhoods in this case) are shared by
the model.
Summing up the last few sections, we can say that most cases of modeling involve
indirect representation, where a model is studied in order to learn about some real-world
target. Models are interpreted structures which stand in relationships of similarity to
target systems. Target systems are, in turn, parts of real-world phenomena.

6. Asking Philosophical Questions with
Models
(p. 272)

Thus far, I have primarily spoken about modeling in a scientific context. I have done so
both because modeling is most at home in the sciences, and because the philosophical
literature about modeling is mostly about scientific modeling. In this section, I turn to
several examples of the use of models in philosophy.

6.1 Fairness and the Social Contract
One well-known instance of philosophical modeling involves the application of game
theory to foundational issues in political philosophy. Philosophers have long been
interested in the question of why rational, egoistic agents would develop the sense of
fairness and justice that seems to be the heart of stable political arrangements. Looking
to the early modern tradition, Jean Hampton (1988) and David Gauthier (1986) showed
that some of Hobbes’ arguments could be reformulated as game-theoretic models. More
recently, Brian Skyrms (1996) and his students have further developed these ideas and
applied evolutionary game-theoretic models to question about the origins of our sense of
fairness.
To take just one example from this rich literature, let’s consider the game called Divide
the Cake. In this game, two players are given a chocolate cake and they have to figure out
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a strategy to divide it before it spoils. Each player asks for a certain fraction, and as long
as those fractions add up to 1 or less, then both get some cake.
As Skyrms points out, the intuitively correct answer is also the fairest one: both should
ask for half the cake. But there is nothing special about this solution. All divisions that
add up to a whole cake are Nash equilibria, meaning that neither player could be better
off changing her strategy unilaterally if that division is employed.
Despite the infinite number of equilibria, we have a very strong sense that the fair
division is a 50/50 split. How could that be? What Skyrms was able to show is that when a
population of dividers repeatedly plays the game and modifies their strategies according
to the ones that lead to the biggest payoffs in cake (formally, employing the replicator
dynamics), then the fair strategy can evolve. Skyrms estimates that with nothing else
added to the model, the 50/50 division evolves 62% of the time (1996). However, once
correlation—interacting with some players more frequently than others—is added to the
model, then the fair split evolves most of the time. Skyrms writes:
In a finite population, in a finite time, where there is some random element in
evolution, some reasonable amount of divisibility of the good and some
correlation, we can say that it is likely that something close to share and share
alike should evolve in dividing-the-cake situations. This is, perhaps, a beginning of
an explanation of the origin of our concept of justice.
Thus, Skyrms is able to show that in repeated interactions with correlation under an
evolutionary dynamic, which might be instantiated in cultural evolution as much as in
biological evolution, fairness norms begin to establish themselves in the population.
Skyrms himself primarily offers this as an explanation of the origin of these norms, a sort
of genealogy of (p. 273) morals. But some philosophers take this kind of modeling to have
normative conclusions. Assuming that we are primarily self-interested, norms of
reciprocity and fairness are justified by their good outcomes, as judged by an egoist.

6.2 Meaning and Signaling
A second case of philosophical modeling concerns the origin of meaning. In Lewis’
Convention (1969), he introduces a game-theoretic analysis of convention and uses this
analysis to investigate how communication can arise without a prior shared language or
communication system.
In the two-agent version of the model, we imagine that the first agent (the sender)
observes the world is in some state Si for which the second agent (the receiver) ought to
perform action Ri . The agents are cooperative such that for each i, if the world is in Si the
sender wants the receiver to perform Ri . In order to achieve this, for each observation,
the sender sends a signal σj which is received by the receiver. The receiver’s contingency
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plan specifies the action Ri that will be performed for each signal σj . Both sender and
receiver aim to achieve a signaling system with the following structure:
S1 ⇒ σ1 ⇒ R1
S2 ⇒ σ2 ⇒ R2
S3 ⇒ σ3 ⇒ R3
⋮
To illustrate this kind of signaling system, Lewis asks us to consider a signaling system
that may have been established between the sexton of the Old North Church and Paul
Revere. If the sexton saw the British army staying at home, he would hang no lanterns in
the belfry. If they set out to attack by land, he would hang one lantern. And if they set out
to attack by sea, then he would hang two lanterns. Revere would stay home if he saw no
lantern, warn of a land attack if he saw one lantern, and warn of sea attack if he saw two
lanterns. The connection between number of lanterns and type of attack is, of course,
purely arbitrary. One lantern might have caused Revere to warn of a sea attack. All that
matters is that there is coordination between the sexton and Revere such that the signal
leads to the right outcome.
In the actual historical case, Revere and the sexton agreed on the code. But what if they
hadn’t? Could this signaling system evolve by itself? More generally, when two agents (or
organisms) have a common interest in communicating, but no shared language, can such
a system evolve? Skyrms (2010) investigated this question by adding learning (change
within an organism’s lifetime) and the replicator dynamic (evolution between the lifetime
of organisms) to the Lewis signaling model.
To investigate learning, Skyrms coupled a Lewis signaling model and Herrnestein’s
matching law. On this probabilistic model of learning, probabilities for taking actions get
updated according to the reward accumulated at previous times. When these dynamics
are applied to the simplest case involving two signals and two actions, the signaling
system (signal 1 leads to action 1, signal 2 leads to action 2, …) is very quickly learned.
Skyrms also investigated this process from an evolutionary point of view. When the same
type of setup (p. 274) is allowed to evolve under the replicator dynamics, signaling
systems are the only stable equilibria. Things get more complicated with greater numbers
of signals and actions, but the overall lesson is the same.

6.3 The Division of Cognitive Labor
The final example that I will discuss comes from philosophy of science. There was a long
tradition in philosophy of science that saw ideal scientists as impartial, cooperative,
motivated by the truth, and always striving to do highly significant work. Although
philosophers knew that real scientists could fall short of these ideals, they took this to be
a more-or-less accurate description of scientists most of the time and the ideals that
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scientists should strive for. Scientific communities function better when they cooperated
in order to find out the truth.
This picture has been called in to question by historians, sociologists, and philosophers.
The classic source for such doubts is Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (1962). Kuhn argued that much of scientific inquiry took the form of
“articulating the paradigm,” a kind of incremental, puzzle-solving activity. He also argued
that in times of scientific revolution, resolution of theoretical controversy had more in
common with religious conversion experiences then with rational discourse. Others
following in this tradition emphasized all the non-rational and even irrational qualities
that characterize scientific behavior. Instead of priests in lab coats, powerful scientists
look like mafia bosses, and their underlings like foot soldiers.
Let’s say that the historians and sociologists are right, and that much about science
seems less than rational. What are the epistemic consequences for the scientific
enterprise? Does lack of communication, lack of epistemically pure motivation, and a
focus on small-scale puzzles mean that we have to change our views about the authority
and productivity and science? A number of philosophers have tried to address these
questions by modeling, and the resultant literature is about the division of cognitive labor.
Among the best known philosophical models in this area are those offered by Philip
Kitcher (1990) and Michael Strevens (2003). Kitcher and Strevens focus on the question
of motivation: What happens when scientists have motives other than the truth?
Specifically, what happens when individual scientists are motivated by getting credit for
important discoveries (presumably because this leads to fame, higher ranked positions,
and money), rather than simply learning about the truth.
Imagine that the scientific community has a particular scientific goal in mind—in his
original scenario, Kitcher describes something like the race to find the structure of DNA.
In order to reach that goal, there are n research approaches that might be taken. Each
research approach has a success function, whose input is the number of scientists taking
that approach and whose output is the probability that the problem will be solved using
that approach.
With this type of model, we can ask two key questions: What is the optimal distribution of
cognitive labor? And how will scientists’ motivations, including non-epistemic motivations
such as those for prestige and credit, lead to different allocations.
On the basis of such models, Kitcher and Strevens argue that classical epistemic norms
will lead scientists to misallocate their cognitive labor. If a classically rational, (p. 275)
truth-seeking agent followed the procedure above, then he or she would join the project
with the highest probability of success. But this isn’t always what the scientific
community as a whole wants to see happen. Maximizing the chance at success might
involve distributing scientists across projects, not just to the projects with the best
chance of success.
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What if scientists were motivated by the accumulation of credit, the recognition that
comes from being the first to make a discovery? To answer this question, let’s assume
that the scientific community adopts the Priority Rule (Merton, 1957), that most or all of
the credit for a discovery goes to the scientist who makes the discovery first. In this case,
scientists will want to take into account both the probability of success of the project and
the probability that they will be the first one to complete the project. The first
consideration pushes scientists towards the project with the overall highest probability of
success, but the second consideration pushes scientists towards projects that have fewer
scientists working on them.
To investigate this question more fully, Strevens (2003) models a representative agent
who is poised to enter the field for the first time. If this agent can choose between n
projects, and knows the current distribution of scientists to projects and the success
functions of these projects, which one would she choose? Strevens shows that if the
scientific community allocates credit according to the Priority Rule, then the community
as a whole achieves the optimum division of cognitive labor. This, he argues, explains why
the scientific community has adopted the Priority Rule, the rule that whoever discovers
something first gets all the credit. So even if scientists strive for credit instead of truth,
the scientific community is well functioning. Further, it might actually function better if
scientists strive for credit than if they are only interested in the truth.
Another line of research in this area has looked at cooperation in science. Famous
laboratories such as the wartime Los Alamos nuclear weapons laboratory (Rhodes, 1987)
and MIT RADAR laboratory (Galison, 1997) planned ways for scientists to continuously
integrate their findings and share ideas with one another. Technological innovations such
as the Internet and rapid forms of electronic publication make this possible on a much
wider and geographically distributed scale. According to classical norms of scientific
inquiry, this is unambiguously good and should be encouraged. But it this really true?
Might such communication lead to the propagation and fixation of errors as well as
knowledge?
Epistemic network models allows us to investigate these questions (Zollman, 2007; see
also Grimm et al., forthcoming). In such models, lines of communication between
scientists are represented by network graphs, such the ones seen in Figure 15.2. Each
node of these graphs represents a scientist and each edge a communication channel. By
altering the connectivity of the graph, from the minimally connected cycle to the
maximally connected complete graph, we can represent different types of scientific
communication—from maximal to minimal.

Click to view larger
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How can this be used to
investigate norms about
communication? In a
Images courtesy of Professor Zollman
recent paper, Zollman
considers networked
scientists trying to decide what propositions are true of the world. Imagine that scientists
are trying to determine whether the world is in state s1 or s2. They get information from
their own experimentation and also from the other scientists they are connected to. On
the basis of this information, they update their beliefs in a standard Bayesian way. When
their beliefs reach some threshold (i.e. the probability is high enough), then they decide
what to believe. The main independent variable in the model is connectedness of
scientists. (p. 276)
Figure 15.2 Three epistemic networks explored by
Zollman. The nodes represent agents, and the edges
represent lines of communication.

Zollman’s model generates two especially interesting results. First, scientists connected
in a cycle converged to the truth more often than scientists connected in a wheel or in a
fully connected graph. This suggests that careful limiting of information available to
scientists may have certain advantages. Or to put it another way, less well-informed
scientists might have an advantage over more well-informed ones, if the goal is to
minimize error. However, when more communicative communities converge to the truth
(or a falsehood), they do so more rapidly. For the ten-scientist communities Zollman
studied, those on complete networks converged about five times faster than those in the
cycle network. So one might conclude from this that too much communication is a bad
thing. Scientific communities may be better off when they partially limit communication,
to ensure that the wrong answers aren’t locked in too quickly.
A final line of philosophical modeling in this area considers how scientific communities
discover significant significant scientific truths. Epistemic landscape models (Weisberg
and Muldoon, 2009) investigate the ways that scientists choose what kinds of problems to
work on and the approaches they take in order to do so. They begin by postulating a set
of approaches, narrow specifications of how a research topic is investigated. These
approaches are then organized by their mutually independent properties. Each one of
these properties is represented as a dimension in an epistemic landscape, whose points
correspond to approaches. An additional dimension corresponds to the epistemic
significance of the approach, giving a topography to the landscape where peaks
correspond to the most highly significant approaches, as in Figure 15.3. However
individual scientists are motivated, a socially optimal outcome would be one where the
peaks are found and so are the many highly significant regions that are not peaks.
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Scientists are represented
in epistemic landscape
models as agents who
make strategic choices
about what approaches to
take. They get feedback
from the landscape about
the significance of the
approaches they have
Click to view larger
taken, and have the
Figure 15.3 A low dimensional epistemic landscape
investigated in Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009. The x
possibility of
and y dimensions correspond to aspects of the
communicating with other
research approach and the z axis corresponds to
degree of epistemic significance.
agents about the
significance of the
Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009
approaches that these
other agents have taken. So an exploration strategy will be the rules an agent follows in
determining which approaches to adopt in each cycle of the model. Should it keep the
current approach, or move on? Should it take into account what others are doing? If so,
how should this information be taken in to account. (p. 277)
In one model, Muldoon and I investigated the last of these questions. We looked at two
extreme ways that scientists can take account of what others are doing in their search for
approaches of high significance. Followers think that the best way to find more significant
truths about the world is to find the approach which has yielded the highest significance
so far, and move in that direction. This is simulated in several steps. At the beginning of
each cycle of the model, followers examine the patches in their Moore neighborhood, the
eight approaches immediately adjacent to the one on which they are currently located.
These patches correspond to the most conceptually similar approaches to the agent’s
current approach. Model agents then move to the previously explored approach of
maximum significance in their Moore neighborhood, if such an approach is available. Like
followers, mavericks pay attention to what others are doing, but they use this information
differently. Instead of moving towards approaches yielding high significance, mavericks
move away from explored territory.
When first working on this project, Muldoon and I expected the followers to do quite well
because the strategy is essentially imitative. We predicted that the followers would help
each other get to the “frontier” of unexplored knowledge, then they would spread out and
discover what there as to discover. Mavericks, we predicted, would do less-well. Since
they are always adopting new approaches, they never allow themselves to build on the
knowledge of those that came before them, which seems to create a disadvantage if they
are trying to find the peak of the epistemic landscape.
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As it turns out, our
imagination led us widely
astray. When we take these
ideas about maverick and
follower strategies and
implement them as
models, we see a very
different result. For ease
of visualization, let’s look
at a simple, threeClick to view larger
dimensional landscape:
Figure 15.4 Epistemic progress of communities of
two dimensions
agents of different types.
correspond to ways that
Weisberg and Muldoon, 2009
approaches can vary, a
third corresponds to
epistemic significance. At the beginning of a simulation, scientist-agents are placed in
random, low-significance regions of the landscape. They are then allowed to implement
the follower (p. 278) strategy or the maverick strategy. The results are striking: the
mavericks massively outperform the followers.
Figure 15.4 shows the epistemic progress (fraction of significant approaches investigated)
against the number of scientists of different types. As we can see from this graph, even
small populations of mavericks massively outperform followers. So our intuition that
followers would be effective was incorrect. In fact, we also were able to show that
populations of followers do no better, and sometimes do worse, than populations that
don’t share any information. This result suggests that while the sharing information can
be a good thing, it can also have unforeseen consequences. Sometimes the community is
better off “spreading out” in epistemic space, not simply building on the best that came
before.
I opened this section by saying that the traditional view of scientists was that they were
impartial, cooperative, motivated by the truth, and always striving to do highly significant
work. Kuhn and others called this picture into question, and drew radical epistemic
conclusions from it. The philosophical modeling described in this section shows some of
the ways that these less-than-ideal individual epistemic virtues may nevertheless be
beneficial at a societal level.

7. Relationship Between Thought Experiments
and Models
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Throughout this chapter, I have often introduced the models I was discussing in the way
one introduces thought experiments. I might introduce Schelling’s model by saying,
“Imagine a city where all the houses are arranged on a grid.” This certainly sounds very
similar to many philosophical thought experiments: “Suppose that I’m locked in a room
and given a large batch of Chinese writing” (Searle, 1980). “Suppose you are the driver of
a (p. 279) trolley. The trolley rounds a bend, and there come into view ahead five track
workmen, who have been repairing the track” (Thomson, 1985).
In this section, I want to think about this apparent similarity between thought
experiments and simulations and ask a couple of questions: Are models and thought
experiments the same kind of thing? Are models better than thought experiments? Should
models replace thought experiments in philosophical theorizing?

7.1 Thought Experiments and Models
Although there is a large philosophical literature about thought experiments (e.g.
Gendler, 2000a; Sorensen, 1992), there is little consensus about what kind of thing
thought experiments are. Most philosophers accept that thought experiments are
imaginary scenarios, and that is how I will understand them in this chapter. If thought
experiments are imaginary scenarios contemplated in order to help us learn something
about the world, then they look very much like models. The main difference is the role of
imagination: I have argued that models are interpreted concrete, mathematical, or
computational structures. Thought experiments, on the other hand, are products of
imaginations. What is the relationship between these things?
One view is that all models are actually a kind of thought experiment. Godfrey-Smith
defends what I call the fictions’ view, arguing that even mathematical models are best
understood as fictional scenarios. In discussing the ways that modelers talk and think
about their models, he writes:
I take at face value the fact that modelers often take themselves to be describing
imaginary biological populations, imaginary neural networks, or imaginary
economies. An imaginary population is something that, if it was real, would be a
concrete flesh-and-blood population, not a mathematical object.
(Godfrey-Smith, 2006)
On a more standard view of models that sees them as structures, not all models are
thought experiments. There are many mathematical and computational structures that
are difficult or even possible to imagine, so they can’t be the same kind of things as
thought experiments, unless one thinks that thought experiments do not literally have to
be imagined. So on this view, the set of models is clearly much larger than the set of
thought experiments. But the converse question remains: are all thought experiments
models or proto-models?
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It is tempting to simply say that thought experiments are models, where imaginative
structures take the place of mathematical, computational, or concrete structures. A more
refined way to link thought experiments to models is to say that the narrative parts of
thought experiments are model descriptions for concrete or computational models.
Without seeing the dynamics of Schelling’s model play out on a computer screen, I can’t
imagine much about the scenario he describes. But here is a very simple Schelling-like
thought experiment: There are 10 houses on a block and only four families, half
Caucasian and half African American. Each family wants to have 50% of its neighbors be
of the same race and, although they are initially placed randomly in houses, they can
move freely in the block until they find a configuration that satisfies them. It is easy to
imagine the equilibrium state of the model: four houses together alternating in racial
makeup.
What was this thought experiment I was engaging in? There are clearly the same
kinds of computational elements as Schelling’s original model: a configuration of agents,
a utility function, and movement rules. The main difference is that this case is sufficiently
simple to have a good intuitive grip on, that could be checked with a computer program
or chessboard. So in this case, the thought experiment is functioning in exactly the same
way as a computational model.
(p. 280)

Here is another kind of case. Gendler (2004) asks us to
[t]hink about your next-door neighbor’s living room, and ask yourself the following
questions: If you painted its walls bright green, would that clash with the current
carpet, or complement it? If you removed all its furniture, could four elephants fit
comfortably inside? If you removed all but one of the elephants, would there be
enough space to ride a bicycle without tipping as you turned?
What is happening in this case when we contemplate, along with Gendler, whether bright
green would in fact clash with the carpet? Gendler argues that our judgments about these
questions are made by creating the relevant mental image of green walls, carpets,
elephants, and bicycles, and then forming a judgment by examining this image. She says
that using a mental image to determine if elephants will fit is analogous to taking “a
three-dimensional scale-model of the room, along with four similarly scaled plastic
elephants … putting the elephants into the room, and seeing whether they fit” (1158). So
in this case, we are using our imagination in exactly the same way that we would use a
concrete model.

7.2 Advantages of Models
If thought experiments are models or proto-models, are there any advantages to being
more formal and constructing full-blown models to replace thought experiments? Is it
sufficient to rely on thought experiments, or should we take the construction of a fully
explicit model as some kind of regulative ideal? In order to answer these questions, I
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think it is worth considering some of the advantages models have over thought
experiments.
In a philosophical context, the main advantages of modeling over thought experiments
are explicitness, reduced inter-philosopher variation, and the ability to deal with
imaginative resistance. Creating and analyzing a model is a process that involves, among
other things, forcing oneself to make all assumptions explicit. Our imaginations are very
flexible and we can construct an imagined scenario from a very minimal script. But when
one has to derive an equation, build something out of plastic, or write a computer
program, this kind of vagueness is not allowable. Programs won’t compile, equations
cannot be derived, and plastic models will fall apart if details are left unspecified. One of
the most common experiences reported by model builders is discovering a missing or
hidden assumption in the course of modeling. This involves finding a resolution, or
realizing that there are multiple avenues worthy of investigation.
A second major advantage is the reduction of inter-philosopher variation. There will
always be philosophical disagreements about how to assess the results of thought
experiments. This is especially true in normative domains, but also true in epistemology
and metaphysics cases. However, sometimes our imaginations cannot even resolve the
(p. 281) phenomenon we are supposed to be judging, or we seem to think different things
would happen. For example, here is a thought experiment suggested by philosopher
Simon May in personal correspondence: Imagine we allowed and encouraged professors
and students to carry firearms on campus. Would there be many fewer or many more
campus shooting fatalities? I can imagine this scenario, and I even know what I think
would happen. But I have no confidence that my imagination is able to resolve the
scenario properly and, therefore, no confidence in my judgment of the case. A major
advantage of modeling in such cases is a determinate answer about what would happen
in such a case, given such-and-so assumptions.
Finally, there are many scenarios that we are simply incapable of imagining, a
phenomenon often called imaginative resistance (Gendler, 2000b; Walton, 2006).
Although morally repugnant cases of imaginative resistance have received the most
attention in the literature, the complex counterfactuals, high-dimensional spaces, massive
aggregation over agents, and atypical mental states that arise in philosophical thought
experiments may also induce resistance. While some of these scenarios may also resist
analysis by modeling, mathematical and computational models do not face the cognitive
and memory limitations of humans. In such cases, a careful description of the setup and
initial conditions may yield to computation, even if not to human imagination.
So should explicit modeling replace thought experiments in philosophical analysis? I think
such a position is both too strong and premature. There are many cases where we can
engage in a thought experiment, but really have no idea how we can create a model for
the case. Moreover, if what I have said in this section of the chapter is true, thought
experiments already have a modeling-like character, so it isn’t obvious how much of an
improved understanding we get by modeling. However, there are enough advantages to
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modeling that a reasonable norm might be as follows: if one can construct and analyze a
philosophical model, then one should attempt it. Short of actually building a model, many
of modeling’s internal norms such as explicitness, publicness, cycling back and forth
between constructing the model, analyzing the model, and revising the model, also make
good norms for thought experiment analysis.

8. How to Get Started Modeling
In this final section, I will make a few brief comments about how to get started modeling.
Unfortunately, it is hard to make such comments without being so general as to be
unhelpful, or so specific as to only be relevant for a particular type of modeling. I will
therefore divide these comments into two sections: the first about general principles of
modeling and the second about agent-based modeling, a type of computational modeling
particularly well suited to many philosophical questions.

8.1 Modeling Cycle
Modeling begins in much
the same way thought
experiments begin, by
formulating a question to
be answered and choosing
a scenario to be
investigated. Rather than
the scenario (p. 282) being
something imagined,
however, the scenario is
what the model’s
interpreted structure will
represent. In some of the
Click to view larger
recent literature on
Figure 15.5 A depiction of the modeling cycle from
modeling methodology,
Railsback and Grimm (2012).
this scenario is referred to
Figure used with permission.
as a hypothesis under
investigation. Because
models are stripped down versions of real-world scenarios, the modeler must pay special
attention both to what gets “put in” a model. Grimm and Railsback (Grimm, et al., 2005;
Grimm and Railsback, 2012) recommend that this be done in a pattern-oriented fashion,
as depicted in Figure 15.5. One identifies patterns observed in some target systems and
uses these to guide the construction of the model.
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Using observed patterns for model design directly ties the model’s structure to the
internal organization of the real system. We do so by asking: What observed
patterns seem to characterize the system and its dynamics, and what variables
and processes must be in the model so that these patterns could, in principle,
emerge?
(Grimm et al., 2005, 987)
How one goes about translating a scenario to a model depends on the type of model one
wishes to build. If one wants to build an agent-based model, then one has to decide,
among other things, who or what the agents are, what the agents are trying to
accomplish, what their resources are, and what rules guide their decisions. If one wishes
to make a game-theoretic model, then one has to identify a game that represents the
scenario, the payoff structure of that game, and if a repeated game, the space of possible
strategies. And so on for other types of models.
Across many model types, some general questions arise. For example, do the model’s
variables represent individuals or aggregates? Is time represented? Are the transition
rules deterministic, probabilistic, or stochastic? Are these rules discrete or continuous
with respect to time? Once answers to these questions and others are settled, one can
choose a model structure and develop a construal.
Once the model is constructed, the process of analysis can begin. In general,
there are two possible kinds of analysis here. If the modeler wishes to engage in complete
analysis of the model, then he or she she will aim to determine:
(p. 283)

1. the static and dynamic properties of the model
2. the allowable states of the model
3. the transitions between states allowed by the model
4. what initiates transitions between states
5. the dependence of states and transitions on one another.
I refer to this list as the total state of the model (Weisberg, 2013).
Complete analysis is usually associated with relatively simple mathematical models. In
such cases, one can give analytical solutions which describe the models’ behavior for
every initial condition and every intermediary state. For more complex models, intensive
computation, along with some approximation, can generate a complete or near-complete
analysis of a model. But in many cases, complete analysis is too difficult to be practical,
and not necessary. In such cases, modelers engage in goal-directed analysis, where they
are investigating a specific set of properties or patterns of the model.
At the beginning of this chapter, I said that modeling was the process of indirect
representation and analysis, and spent some time explaining how a model can represent a
target in virtue of being similar to such a target. In order to “transfer” the results of an
analysis of a model to a target, we need to know something about this similarity. Since
models are almost never truthful representations of their targets, we are not looking for
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confirmation that the model is truthful. Rather, we are looking for validation, that the
model resembles the target in certain respects, and then confirmation that the analytical
results are confirmed in virtue of this validation.

8.2 Agent-Based Modeling
Much recent work in philosophical modeling, including many of the examples I have
discussed, take an agent-based approach. Such models explicitly represent individuals, as
opposed to aggregates with aggregate-level properties. For philosophers new to
modeling, I suggest beginning with models of this type because of the availability of a
straightforward, powerful, and free tool called Netlogo (Wilensky, 1999).
Netlogo is a high-level programming language, especially appropriate for creating
simulations of social and natural phenomena that can be broken down into individuals or
agents, which are called turtles in this framework. Although Netlogo is a powerful
language that has been widely adopted by modelers across the natural and social
sciences, it is very straightforward to learn due to its close association with a family of
programming languages specifically designed for teaching. The original Logo language
was one of the first pieces of educational software written in the late 1960s for the PDP-1.
The best way to get started with Netlogo is twofold: First, one should choose a few of its
dozens of example models and explore them. Both the interface side and the programs
themselves are well documented and explained. Much can be learned by modifying,
(p. 284) breaking, and fixing these existing models. Second, Agent-Based and IndividualBased Modeling (Railsback and Grimm, 2012) is an essential textbook for beginners. It
combines helpful discussions on all aspects of agent-based modeling methodology with
practical advice on programming in Netlogo, and it is accessible to complete beginners.

References
Campbell, N. R. (1957). Foundations of Science. New York: Dover.
Cartwright, N. (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Da Costa, N. C. A., and French, S. (2003). Science and Partial Truth. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Real Patterns. Journal of Philosophy, 88(1), 27–51.
Dray, W. H. (1968). On Explaining How-Possibly. The Monist, 52(3), 390–407.
Duhem, P. (1906). The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.

Page 25 of 29

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
Elliott-Graves, A. (ms) Target Systems and Their Role in Scientific Inquiry. (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). University of Pennsylvania
Forber, P. (2010). Confirmation and Explaining How Possible. Studies in History and
Philosophy of Science Part C, 41(1), 32–40.
Galison, P. (1997). Image and Logic: A Material Culture of Microphysics. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Gardner, M. (1970). The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway’s New Solitaire Game
“Life”. Scientific American, 223, 120–3.
Gauthier, D. P. (1986). Morals by Agreement. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gendler, T. (2000a) Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases.
New York: Garland Press.
Gendler, T. (2000b). The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. The Journal of Philosophy, 97,
55–81.
Gendler, T. (2004) Thought Experiments Rethought—and Reperceived. Philosophy of
Science, 71: 1152–64.
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2006). The Strategy of Model Based Science. Biology and Philosophy,
21, 725–40.
Goodman, N. (1972). Seven Strictures on Similarity. In N. Goodman (ed.) Problems and
Projects, pp. 23–32. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril.
Grim, Singer, Fisher, Bramson, Berger, Reade, Flocken, and Sales (forthcoming).
Scientific Networks on Data Landscapes: Question Difficulty, Epistemic Success, and
Convergence. Episteme.
Grimm, V., and Railsback, S. F. (2012). Pattern-Oriented Modelling: A “Multi-Scope” for
Predictive Systems Ecology. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences, 367 (1586), 298–310.
Hampton, J. (1988). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hendry, R., and Psillos, S. (2007). How to Do Things with Theories: An Interactive View of
Language and Models in Science. In J. Brzeziński, A. Klawiter, T. A. Kuipers, K. Łastowski,
(p. 285) K. Paprzycka, and P. Przybysz (eds.), The Courage of Doing Science: Essays
Dedicated to Leszek Nowak, pp. 59–115. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Page 26 of 29

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
Hesse, M. B. (1966). Models and Analogies in Science. South Bend: University of Notre
Dame Press.
Kitcher, P. (1990). The Division of Cognitive Labor. The Journal of Philosophy, 87(1), 5–22.
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Lewis, David. 1969. Convention. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lloyd, E. A. (1994). The Structure and Confirmation of Evolutionary Theory (second edn.).
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Merton, R. (1957) Priorities in Scientific Discovery. American Sociological Review, 22,
635–59.
Morgan, M. S. (2012). The World in the Model: How Economists Work and Think.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Muldoon, R., Smith, T., and Weisberg, M. (2012). Segregation That No One Seeks.
Philosophy of Science, 79, 38–62.
Quine, W. V. O. (1969). Natural Kinds. In W. V. O. Quine (ed.), Ontological Relativity and
Other Essays, pp. 26–68. New York: Columbia University Press.
Railsback, S. F., and Grimm, V. (2012). Agent-Based and Individual-Based Modeling: A
Practical Introduction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Resnik, D. B. (1991). How-Possibly Explanations in Biology. Acta Biotheoretica, 39(2),
141–9.
Rhodes, R. (1987). Making of the Atomic Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton.
Searle, J. R. (1980). Minds, Brains, and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3),
417–57.
Skyrms, B. (1996). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Skryms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information. Oxford: Oxford
Univeristy Press.
Sorensen, R. A. (1992) Thought Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Strevens, M. (2003). The Role of the Priority Rule in Science. The Journal of Philosophy,
100(2), 55–79.

Page 27 of 29

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in
Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy).
Subscriber: University of Pennsylvania; date: 28 November 2017

Modeling
Suppe, F. (1989). The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism. Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
Suppes, P. (1960). A Comparison of the Meaning and Uses of Models in Mathematics and
the Empirical Sciences. Synthese, 12(2–3), 287–300.
Thomson, J. J. (1985) The Trolley Problem. The Yale Law Journal, 94(6), 1395–415.
Tversky, A. (1977). Features of Similarity. Psychological Review, 84, 327–52.
Tversky, A., and Gati, I. (1978). Studies of Similarity. In E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (eds.),
Cognition and Categorization, pp. 79–98. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Van Fraassen, B. C. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walton, K. (2006). On the (so-called) Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance. In S. Nichols (ed.),
The Architecture of the Imagination, pp. 137–48. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Watson, J. D. (2011). The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the
Structure of DNA. New York: Scribner.
Weisberg, M. (2007) Who is a Modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 58,
207–33.
Weisberg, M. (2013). Simulation and Similarity: Using Models to Understand the World.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Weisberg, M., and Muldoon, R. (2009). Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of
Cognitive Labor. Philosophy of Science, 76(2), 225–52.
Wilensky, U. 1999. NetLogo. <http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/>
(accessed September 18, 2015). Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based
Modeling, Northwestern University. Evanston, IL.
(p. 286)

Zollman, K. J. (2007). The Communication Structure of Epistemic Communities.
Philosophy of Science, 74(5), 574–87.

Notes:
(1) This is a much-simplified form of the similarity equations developed in Weisberg, 2013.
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